Brazil: The PT, Democracy and Socialism (english)

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The following article originally appeared in _Monthly Review_,
Vol. 42 No. 4, September 1990.

Maria Helena Moreira Alves is one of the founders of the
Brazilian Workers' Party and is a member of the education
department of the CUT, _Central Unica dos Trabalhadores_,
Brazil's left labor federation representing over fifteen million
workers. She is the author of _State and Opposition in Military
Brazil_ (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).


*****


Building Democratic Socialism:
The Partido dos Trabalhadores in Brazil

by Maria Alves


By 1978 Brazil's "economic miracle" had come to an end, and the
social costs of severe income inequality were becoming
unbearable. The Catholic church had moved strongly into the
opposition to the military government. Progressive sectors of the
church, committed to the theology of liberation, were actively
organizing the poor in Base Christian Communities, neighborhood
organizations, peasant and Indian movements, and rural trade
unions. Because of repressive conditions, most social movements
organized quietly, in small and decentralized groups.

In April 1978, to the surprise of Brazil's military rulers,
workers rebelled. Auto workers strikes, involving 140,000
metalworkers in Sao Paulo, the nation's most industrialized area,
rapidly spread over the country and throughout the economy;
within a few weeks over 500,000 workers were on strike. The
strikes of 1978 had a profound impact on the working class: fear
was broken. The vast civil disobedience movement succeeded both
in achieving salary gains and in delegitimizing the military's
anti-strike legislation. The strike movement of 1978 also
established Luis Inacio (Lula) da Silva, the president of the
Metalworkers' Union of Sao Bernardo do Campo and Diadema, on the
outskirts of Sao Paulo, as a new kind of working class leader.
Charismatic, capable of holding the attention of thousands of
workers in open-air assemblies, yet profoundly attached to the
idea of rank-and-file participation, Lula rapidly became one of
the most important political figures in Brazil.

In 1979, more than three million workers in Brazil went on strike
for better working conditions and against the strict salary
squeeze imposed by the military government. The unprecedented
wave of strikes across the nation, in urban and rural areas, set
the stage for a new unionism characterized by strong rank-and-
file participation and organization in the workplace. Workers had
already learned to organize in their communities, setting up
neighborhood associations to mobilize residents to effectively
pressure the government to respond to their needs. These
neighborhood organizations intertwined with the new trade union
movement to build the most widespread grassroots movement in
Brazilian history.

Toward the end of 1979, however, many trade union and community
leaders began to doubt that grassroots organizations alone could
reverse established governmental policies. Workers discovered
they could overturn some repressive measures and gain some
concessions, but they could not change the basic economic
policies of the government. The 1979 strikes led activists to the
conclusion that social movements were not enough. Unless workers
could effectively organize an instrument of political mediation
their efforts to transform the economy would be in vain. What
workers could gain with strikes could be rapidly undone by
political measures the would decrease salaries.

In a series of seminars and discussions radical activists
analyzed Brazilian capitalism and drafted alternatives for the
working class movement. One of the most important conclusions to
emerge from these meetings was that workers needed a political
party that could remain deeply connected to the grassroots
movements and could represent working class interests in
struggles over state policies. It was necessary to build a
political party that would be flexible enough to include the
different political views of those active in the grassroots and
at the same time strong enough to compete for electoral office
with bourgeois parties. It was also necessary to build a
socialist party that would reflect the experience of workers in
Brazil, building socialism from the day-to-day struggles in the
workplace and in neighborhoods. Thus, in 1979, the _Partido dos
Trabalhadores_ (the PT or Workers' Party) was founded:


The idea of the Workers' Party arose with the advance and
reinforcement of this new and broad-based social movement
which now extends from the factories to the neighborhoods,
from unions to the Basic Christian Communities, from the
Cost of Living Movements to the Dwellers Associations, from
the Student Movement to the Professional Associations, from
the Movement of Black People to the Women's Movement, as
well as others, like those who struggle for the rights of
indigenous peoples. [_Partido dos Trabalhadores: "Declaracao
Politica_," Sao Bernardo do Campo, October 13, 1979. Cited
in Margaret Keck, _The Workers' Party and Democratization
in Brazil_, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992.]

Nine years later, in the municipal elections of November 1988,
the Workers' Party--so socialist, so radical, and still so young-
-surprised political observers with victories in such major
cities as Sao Paulo, Santos, Vitoria, and Porto Alegre. Sao
Paulo, with 13 million inhabitants, is the third world's largest
industrial center, and the key to the economic and political life
of Brazil. Santos and Vitoria are among Brazil's largest ports.
Port Alegre, capital of the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul,
is the south's most important industrial and cultural center. The
PT also won 30 other important city governments and came
extremely close to winning the key state capitals of Rio de
Janeiro and Belo Horizonte. In addition, a very close vote showed
the PT's strength in the Amazon region.

In November and December of 1989, Brazil held its first free,
direct presidential elections in 30 years. In the first round,
among 22 candidates, Lula placed second with 11.6 million votes.
In the second round Lula was supported by a broad alliance which
included the populist _Partido Democratico Trabalhista_, whose
candidate Leonel Brizola had placed third with 11.2 million
votes, and the _Partido Social Democratico Brasileiro_, whose
candidate Mario Covas was fourth with 7.8 million votes. Lula
lost the runoff to his conservative opponent, Fernando Collor de
Mello. Although Collor's base was small, with the backing of
national and international capital, and Brazil's largest
television network, in the final count Collor won with 53 percent
of the vote.

Although Lula lost the election, _a labor leader, with strong
socialist politics, had received 31 million votes_. This result
firmly established the PT not only as one of Brazil's most
important political parties, with a clear hegemony on the left,
but as a party with great international significance.


Where Did the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_ Come From?

The Workers' Party arose as a direct consequence of Brazil's
great economic and social inequality. In 1988, the richest 20
percent of the population appropriated two-thirds of the national
income; the richest 1 percent appropriated an amount equal to
that of the poorest 50 percent. In 1989, although average
national income was over $2,000 per person, in more than one-
third of Brazil's families per person income was only $180. With
this pattern of inequality, malnutrition due to poverty is the
leading cause of Brazil's extremely high infant mortality rate:
65 per 1000 babies born alive, a much higher rate than that of
such neighbors as Venezuela (36), Argentina (33), or Uruguay
(27). According to the World Health Organization, approximately
10 million Brazilians receive less than the daily minimum
nutrition required for survival. Government statistics show that
there are 32 million children living in absolute poverty and more
than 7 million children abandoned in the streets of the cities.
The PT is deeply committed to the transformation of the political
and economic structures of the society which have been
responsible for the growing misery of 80 percent of the Brazilian
population.

The Workers' Party not only proposes to redistribute income with
immediate economic reform programs, it is an organization for the
_empowerment_ of working people who, because of long standing
patterns of discrimination and inequality, have been denied
democratic participation. The PT has provided the opportunity for
those who are oppressed to regain a voice, to build their
dignity, and to win recognition of their rights. Those who were
never included when it came to decide matters of budget, of
development programs, of distribution of wealth and income, of
urban and rural poverty tenure, now find that they can
participate in decision making and experience the energy which
comes from collective organization. As Lula wrote in the
introduction to the PT's presidential platform:


There is no future for Brazil if the energy of the people
(and the joy which comes with it) cannot be freely expressed.
If I was asked to summarize in one sentence the meaning of
our program I would say: we mean to reorganize Brazilian
society, giving the leading role to those who live in the
world of work. It is a radical proposal: teachers, workers,
doctors, artists, men and women of the countryside, writers,
rubber tree tappers, journalists, fishermen, small businessmen,
engineers and all other people who, like those above, construct
the present with their work. For them we must build the future.
We cannot imagine Brazil without them and we do not want a
Brazil which is against them. This is the great message of
the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_.


The roots of the PT are not only socio-economic. The PT's
political strategy has been built upon the accumulated historical
experience of the working class movement in Brazil, especially a
critique of the legacy of Getulio Vargas's populism and the
legacy of the Brazilian Communist Party.

Getulio Vargas first took power in Brazil in 1938, after a
military coup that instituted the authoritarian and corporatist
_Estado Novo_ (New State). Vargas, a charismatic leader who
admired Benito Mussolini, copied Brazil's 1945 Labor Code from
Mussolini's _Carta del Lavoro_. The Labor Code's corporatist's
measures tied trade unions to the state, allowing the Ministry of
Labor to recognize trade unions, dissolve them, intervene in
elections, remove officials from union posts, and control all
matters pertaining to finances, budget, and bargaining rights.

The Labor Code also prohibited horizontal organization of workers
in a central federation. The entire structure was meant to
prevent the class consciousness of workers by connecting civil
society's organizations to the state in a corporatist pyramid.
During the period from the overthrow of Vargas in 1946 to the
military coup of 1964, Brazil's formally democratic governments
did not strictly enforce the Labor Code, and workers organized in
a climate of relative flexibility as populist governments sought
working class support for their policies. However, the Labor Code
itself was never repealed. After 1964, the military government
applied in full all the Labor Code's restrictions on organizing:
controlling union budgets, decertifying many unions, and removing
from office all trade union officials who did not comply with the
policies imposed by the military.

After the overthrow of the _Estado Novo_ dictatorship, Vargas
continued to play an important role in Brazil as a populist
leader who founded the _Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro_ (PTB).
The PTB mediated working class demands and provided a political
mechanism to mobilize workers around specific populist leaders
and reform programs. The party was connected to state-controlled
trade unions, and unionists were regularly co-opted into agencies
to collaborate with government policies. The main characteristic
of the PTB was that of a _mobilizing_, rather than an
_organizing_, political party, mobilizing workers to elect
charismatic populist leaders and to support their policies rather
than building autonomous political organizations of workers and
promoting class consciousness, Within the general framework of
populist politics there was little role for the working class as
an _autonomous_ political actor.

The working class leaders who founded the PT in 1979 were very
aware of the dangers of this legacy of corporatism, co-optation,
and clientalism. Their political experience was rooted in
organizational activities in the context of the strictly
government-controlled unions set up under Vargas's Labor Code.
Working class movements after 1964 had organized union opposition
groups to fight government-appointed union bureaucrats and sought
an alternative form of rank-and-file organization in the
workplace. Much of the Catholic church, in reaction to the
economic and social inequalities and to the repression, had moved
into the opposition and organized working people in neighborhood
associations, mothers' clubs, and Basic Christian Communities.
Peasants were meeting quietly and learning to defend their right
to land as well as win better conditions for agricultural
laborers. All of the many social movements in Brazil had in
common a deep commitment to popular _empowerment_ through the
exercise of leadership and collective decision-making. In
addition, a search for autonomy of organization was perhaps the
key ingredient that united all groups of working class opposition
to the military governments after 1964.* [*On this point of the
history of the trade union movement in Brazil and its search for
autonomy, see my article "Trade Unions in Brazil: A Search for
Autonomy and Organization" in Edward Epstein, ed. _Labor Autonomy
and the State in Latin America_ (Winchester, Mass.: Unwin Hyman,
1989)]

From this historical perspective, these trade unionists and
community organizers consciously wished to avoid founding a party
based on a populist framework, and intended to move the working
class from a position of backstage mobilizing to frontline
organizing as _independent major political actors_. This position
of autonomy and empowerment was, perhaps, best expressed in an
exchange that took place in 1979 between Lula and Brizola.
Brizola, most important inheritor of the populist legacy in
Brazil, was attempting to convince Lula to join his effort to
reestablish the traditional PTB. Brizola argued, "We are reaching
the river and it is necessary that we, as leaders, show the
people where to cross it." Lula replied, "I think it is time that
the people should learn where and how to swim by themselves."
With the idea that the "people should learn where and how to
swim" the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_ was born.

The founders of the Workers' Party also drew on the experience of
the _Partido Communista Brasileiro_ (PCB). The PCB had deep roots
in the working class movement since its founding in 1922 in
connection with autonomous trade unions, and it became one of the
leading organizers or underground resistance during the Vargas
dictatorship. Because of this early history, the PCB enjoyed a
high degree of legitimacy within the working class. The PCB
organized mostly in a clandestine or semi-clandestine fashion
from its founding days and became characterized by a top-down
structure, rather rigid in its following of "democratic
centralism," with little room for internal debate and dissent.
The Brazilian Communist Party is known as one of the most
orthodox in Latin America.

After the end of the Vargas dictatorship, the PCB worked in loose
and unofficial alliances in support of populist politicians. Its
basic theoretical position on political action emphasized unity
with the local bourgeoisie against imperialism. The PCB held
strictly to this policy even after the military coup of 1964,
and, within the resistance, argued for center-left unity with
bourgeois sectors to overthrow the military government. This
emphasis on alliances with the bourgeoisie caused a series of
splits in the PCB and the loss of a significant number of its
working class militants.

In 1979, at the time of the founding of the PT, the PCB argued
for a soft line on strikes in order to build a secure inter-class
alliance capable of overthrowing the dictatorship. Because many
of the strikes deeply affected the interests of the national
bourgeoisie, the PCB instructed its trade unionists to negotiate
agreements with local capital in such a manner as to take
advantage of what the PCB believed to be an inherent
contradiction between local and international capital. This
position became the subject of heated polemics within the new
trade union movement, eventually leading to a new series of
splits from the PCB. Some members left the party to join social
democratic and populist parties; others supported the efforts to
found the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_. Those members of the PCB
who joined the PT did not believe in the effectiveness of an
"inter-class alliance" because of the deep connection between
local and international capital in Brazil. And they were
frustrated by "democratic centralism" and the inability of rank-
and-file militants to influence the party platform. They joined
the PT to have a more active voice in decision making.


Building the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_

How could a mass-based, democratic and socialist party be created
within the strict limitations imposed by the military state? How
could the party's leaders and militants work both within and in
opposition to the system?

The Political Party Law of 1979 established the limitations on
party organization. First, the law prohibited formation of a
political party based on "appeals to class, race, sex or
religious beliefs." Second, the law required the registration of
party members, which meant that workers were vulnerable to
pressure and that the security police could easily keep tabs on
party membership. Third, the law required that parties be
organized from the top down, with a national executive committee
selecting the members of party regional and municipal committees.
There were, in addition, a variety of complicated legal
requirements for holding local conventions.

Most political parties in Brazil have been molded by this
legislation. They have a top-down structure in which power lies
exclusively with the national executive committee. All decisions
are made by the top leadership who do not even attempt to
organize the rank and file. Accepting the various legal
impediments, the traditional political parties exist mainly at
election times and have little mobilizing power, counting on
financial support to hire campaign workers during elections. They
have institutionalized the patron-client relationships of
Brazil's patriarchal society and serve as distributors of
organized favors.

The PT has attempted to avoid this institutionalized pattern. In
order to legally exist as a political party and at the same time
fulfill its intent to build a mass-based democratic party, the PT
developed two forms of organization. The first strictly complied
with the law. The second, a parallel structure, allowed the party
to institutionalize mechanisms of rank-and-file participation and
to establish an organization from the bottom up. Those who can
fight off political or job pressures formally register as party
members. Many more people register only in internal party records
but participate with equal rights in all committees, conventions,
and meetings; these are the party's _militantes_. A third and
even more numerous group is comprised of sympathizers who support
the party, contribute financially, and largely provide the free
labor for all party campaigns. Some ten years after its founding,
the PT has approximately 400,000 officially registered members
[today this figure is closer to 700,000--BEIC], slightly over one
million _militantes_, and over four million activists or
sympathizers.

The PT regularly holds local, regional, and national conventions
as established by the law, with national conventions which elect
members of the national executive committee which, in turn, names
all other members of regional or local committees. However, these
"official conventions" are only _pro forma_. In reality, the
"official conventions" simply sanction decisions which are
previously taken by "pre-conventions" held at local, regional,
and national levels, and involving all party members whether or
not they are legally registered.

The actual structure of the party is democratic and alive with
membership participation. The PT is organized in local units
called _nucleos_, in neighborhoods or workplaces: for example,
the _nucleo_ of the Ford Motor plant, the _nucleo_ of the
University of Sao Paulo, the _nucleo_ of the _Banco do Brasil_,
the _nucleo_ of rubber-tree tappers of Araguaia, the _nucleo_ of
the district of Nova Iguacu, of Sao Joao de Meriti, of
Copacabana, and so forth, throughout the country. The flexibility
of organization by place of work or residence allows broad
participation in the day to day discussions of issues, national
concerns, party platforms, choosing candidates, etc.

The _nucleo_ organization also allows for control by the rank and
file. One can only join the party at its most basic and lively
level, the _nucleo_, with the approval of fellow workers or
neighbors. The criterion for _nucleo_ membership is militancy in
social movements. The _nucleos_ meet regularly, some monthly,
others every week. Documents on issues of concern to the party
are distributed to each _nucleo_ for discussion by members. Their
opinions are reflected in documents which are discussed in all
local "pre-conventions." The documents that are approved by the
local "pre-convention" delegates are then taken to discussions at
the regional "pre-conventions" and finally the national "pre-
convention." Rank-and-file delegates are chosen in elections of
each _nucleo_, in proportion to the numbers of members who belong
to the _nucleo_. They vote in the municipal "pre-convention"
electing delegates to the regional "pre-convention" and in turn
they elect delegates to the national "pre-convention." In this
way the PT guarantees a reversal of the pyramid with the
institutionalization of a party structure _pela base_ (from the
base).

Although many problems arise from inefficient distribution of
materials, lack of experience in running assemblies, and myriad
other constraints, the organizational structure ensures constant
discussion of issues and a high degree of participation in all
matters relevant to the party, its programs, platform, and
candidates for public office.* [*In _Change from Below_ (this was
a working title; the published title is _The Workers' Party and
Democratization in Brazil_ --BEIC), Margaret Keck discusses the
complaints of many members of the PT about the malfunctioning of
the _nucleos_ and, particularly, of the inefficient system of
distribution of party documents. I believe that the latter has
been the most important problem for the implementation of
_nucleo_ participation policies. It is indeed difficult with
limited resources to distribute materials throughout Brazil.
There is much recent debate in the PT about the need to
decentralize the production, printing, and distribution of
materials to the district level to increase efficiency.] The top
leadership's wishes are often reversed by the "pre-conventions."
In 1988 Sao Paulo delegates nominated Luiza Erundina for mayor
instead of Congressman Plinio de Arruda Sampaio who was Lula's
and the Sao Paulo Executive Committee's preferred candidate. The
majority of top leaders, including Lula, campaigned for Fernando
Gabeira, president of the Green Party, but delegates,
nonetheless, chose Joao Paulo Bisol, a southern senator of the
Brazilian Socialist Party, who had won public recognition for his
pro-worker activity during the Constituent Assembly.

Within the PT, internal democracy is exercised through a complex
system of proportionate voting in "pre-conventions." The
membership of the PT includes people of a variety of political
ideologies: progressive members of the Catholic church,
progressive Protestants, members of Marxist-Leninist groups, ex-
members of armed struggle organizations, former members of the
Brazilian Communist Party, independent socialists, Trotskyists,
and members of social movements without any particularly defined
ideology. Members form a number of well defined groups known as
_tendencias_ (tendencies). They present documents for discussion
during _nucleo_ meetings and all "pre-conventions." The
_tendencia_ which has the majority of the membership's
participation is the _Articulacao_ comprised of trade unionists,
Catholic church and Protestant militants, and independent
socialists. There is an array of other _tendencias_, mostly those
which come out of various Trotskyist groups. All documents
presented by the _tendencias_ are discussed and voted on. During
the municipal, regional, or national "pre-conventions_" the
_tendencias_ organize their own slates and compete for the vote
of the delegates. The party posts at all levels are decided on
the basis of proportion of votes.

There is much complaining among the smaller _tendencias_ that the
procedures do not work properly. They claim that the majority
imposes its viewpoint and makes it difficult for minority
documents to be properly distributed. Members of _Articulacao_,
the majority group, on the other hand, say that the Trotskyist
_tendencias_ organize themselves as a "party within the party,"
meet before the conventions, and engage in gerrymandering
techniques to make sure that their small numbers will count more
when the votes are taken.

The question of obedience to party decisions and party platforms,
once they are formally established, has also become a source of
growing tension between members of _Articulacao_ and the
Trotskyists. Sometimes the smaller groups set off on their own to
carry out policies which were specifically defeated in the open
assemblies of the party's "pre-convention." This practice has led
to a recent debate in the PT over mechanisms to enforce party
discipline. [The recent affair concerning the Socialist
Convergence tendency illustrates this point. --BEIC]

As the PT has gained experience--and political power--the
question of the participation of members in the making of public
policy has become a crucial issue which has fomented bitter party
debates. It is one of the PT's most cherished conceptions that
its administrations shall institutionalize mechanisms for direct
popular participation in the decision-making process of
government. The PT program calls for the formation of citizens'
committees, elected by direct popular ballot, concerned with
specific issues, such as education, health, and transportation.
These committees are to work directly with the city government to
formulate policy and decide matters of budget in their area of
concern. In addition, the PT calls for the election of the
popular councils in neighborhoods as auxiliary representative
organs to help make and oversee the implementation of policies.

The formation of this institutionalized direct-participation
program blurs the boundaries of party participation. Some members
of the PT argue that the citizens' committees and the popular
council should be, in essence, organizations of the party itself
to institutionalize membership participation in the government's
decision-making process. Virtually all the mayors who were
elected by the PT have resisted this understanding of popular
administration. They are supported by many members of the party
in their argument that once they are elected to office as mayors
they are sworn to represent _all of the people_ of the particular
city--not just the membership of the PT, and cannot allow the
popular councils and citizens' committees to become exclusively
controlled by the party. This interpretation views the process of
popular administration as implanting institutionalized mechanisms
for _popular participation in government_, direct citizen-
government relationships not mediated through one political
party. Because of the political power implications, this issue
has become the source of the most bitter divisions and intra-
party struggles in all city administrations of the PT.


Conclusion

The _Partido dos Trabalhadores_ was born from social movements.
It is deeply interconnected with grassroots and working class
organizations both in urban and rural areas. However, social
movements in Brazil are determined to keep an autonomy vis-a-vis
political parties. The _Central Unica dos Trabalhadores_ (CUT),
which represents 15 million workers, for example, maintains a
close relationship to the PT but is not monopolized by it. In
some regions--e.g., Rio de Janeiro and Rio Grande do Sul--
Brizola's PDT holds a hegemonic position with the CUT.

Social movements which are not only of the working class but are
concerned with a specific issue--e.g., the women's movement, the
black consciousness movement, the environmentalist movement--
organize autonomously outside of the PT. Members of these
movements have a double militancy, permeating all levels of the
PT and exerting considerable influence to determine party program
and draft government policy. The PT, in its brief existence, has
already elected three women as mayors of extremely important
cities (Sao Paulo, Santos, and Fortaleza) and the first black
congresswoman in Brazilian history [Benedita da Silva --BEIC].
The presence of these movements, interconnected to the PT, has
enabled the party to make some innovative proposals and pass
progressive legislation and also affected the new constitution of
1987. The movements _shape_ the policies of the PT but maintain a
position of independence and autonomy vis-a-vis governments.*
[*For details of the PT's relationship to social movements see my
forthcoming article: "The Workers' Party of Brazil: Building
Struggle from the Grassroots" in William K. Tabb, editor, _The
Future of Socialism_ (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990).]

The decentralized party structure of the PT is consistent with
the political principle of democratic socialism because the means
are just as important as the ends. It is impossible to build a
democratic and socialist society on authoritarian structures of
organization. One of the main aspects of the _partido dos
Trabalhadores_ is the richness of discussions, debates, and the
competition between different _tendencias_ within the party. The
PT, however, has not altogether solved the problem of exercising
party discipline. It is generally held that once a decision is
reached on a major policy or strategy all _tendencias_ should
respect it, defend it publicly, and organize in a unified manner.
This has not always been the case and, at times, specific groups
set out on their own, causing a great deal of difficulty for the
PT and its elected representatives alike. The question of how to
enforce party discipline without falling into rigid regulations
of "democratic centralism" has been one of the major problems of
the PT.

Perhaps the most important role of the _Partido dos
Trabalhadores_ has been the empowerment of the working class in
Brazil. Paulo Freire, one of the PT's most influential members,
often reminded us of the negative aspects of the oppressor's
consciousness upon the oppressed. People who are oppressed may
come to view themselves through the eyes of the oppressor and,
therefore, feel devalued, without their own voice and power. The
decentralized structure of the PT has enabled millions of
oppressed people in Brazil to participate actively in
discussions, recover a sense of self-worth, exercise their
individual voices, and as a consequence, become empowered. This
empowerment allows the oppressed to take history into their own
hands and believe that, collectively, they are capable of
transforming the political, economic, and social structures which
oppress them. This has been a revolutionary transformation of
truly historic dimensions and is the PT's most lasting
contribution to the liberation of the working class in Brazil.

The experience of the _Partido dos Trabalhadores_ in Brazil is
perhaps important to other nations as well. First of all, it is
significant that a political party, born from a grassroots social
movement, could maintain an overall democratic structure
sufficient to ensure its dynamic flexibility while, at the same
time, not losing sight of the ultimate purpose of a political
party: winning political power. Albeit the PT still has many
problems to resolve, its experiences in the exercise of political
power have been enormously innovative and encouraging. By
attempting to put into practice the theory of participatory
democracy, the PT has broadened the conception of representative
democracy through the incorporation of direct participation in
public policy. In addition, the PT's conception of democratic
socialism opens new arenas for the debate on workplace democracy,
worker control, and worker-government relations. As Lula said,
with a smile, in answer to a question by his opponent in a
televised debate during the [1989] presidential campaign: "The PT
feels very comfortable with the events in the Soviet Union. It
has been practicing _glasnost_ from its founding days, well in
advance of Gorbachev."* [*The PT, it might be added, was the
first major party of the left in Latin America to support
Poland's Solidarity.] Finding different solutions to questions of
political power, discovering new mechanisms for the incorporation
of citizens in public policy-making, putting into practice ideas
of internal party democracy, implementing alternative
developmental and economic programs in government, serving the
function of administrator, mediator, and educator of the
population in important issues--in all of these areas the PT's
experience has helped develop new modes of social and political
organizing.



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